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The story of the referendum is usually told through geography: areas that had been left
behind by globalisation voted to Leave. But this tells us only so much, writes Eric
Kaufmann. Knowing where Leave voters live does not, in itself, explain why individuals
chose to vote a certain way. Here, he demonstrates the importance of invisible diﬀerences
between groups, and argues that it was primarily values that motivated voters, not economic
inequality.
Britain’s choice to vote Leave, we are told, is a protest by those left behind by modernisation
and globalisation. London versus the regions, poor versus rich. Nothing could be further from the truth. Brexit
voters, like Trump supporters, are motivated by identity, not economics. Age, education, national identity and
ethnicity are more important than income or occupation. But to get to the nub of the Leave-Remain divide, we
need to go even deeper, to the level of attitudes and personality.
Strikingly, the visible diﬀerences between groups are less important than invisible diﬀerences between
individuals. These don’t pit one group against another, they slice through groups, communities and even
families. Our brains deal better with groups than personality diﬀerences because we latch onto the visible stuﬀ.
It’s easy to imagine a young student or London professional voting Remain; or a working-class man with a
northern accent backing Leave.
Open and Closed personalities are harder to conjure up: yet these invisible diﬀerences are the ones that count
most – around two or three times as much as the group diﬀerences. A second problem is that many analyses
are spatial. Don’t get me wrong: I love maps and diﬀerences between place are important, especially for ﬁrst-
past-the-post elections. However, some characteristics vary a lot over space and others don’t.
Figure 1 ranks Local Authorities and England and Wales by the average social grade of their White British
residents. The lower the average class position of White British residents, the higher the vote for Brexit. In fact,
this working class index explains 58 per cent of the variation in the Leave vote across districts. But, according to
the 2015 British Election Study Internet Panel of over 24,000 respondents, class only explains 1-2 per cent of
the variation in Brexit voting intention among individuals. There may have been a slight shift over the past year,
but this won’t have altered the results much.
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Figure 1, source: Census data; Electoral Commission
Why the discrepancy? Social characteristics such as class, ethnicity or region are related to where people live,
so they vary from place to place. Psychology and personality do vary over space a little because they are
aﬀected a bit by social characteristics like age. But they are mainly shaped by birth order, genetics, life
experiences and other inﬂuences which vary within, not across, districts.
Aggregate analysis distorts individual relationships even when there aren’t problems caused by the ecological
fallacy. The sex ratio, for instance, is more or less the same from one place to another, so even if gender really
mattered for the vote, maps hide this truth. On the other hand, maps can also exaggerate. If 1 per cent of
Cornwall votes for the Cornish nationalists then Cornwall would light up on a map of Cornish nationalist voting
with a 100 per cent correlation. But knowing that all Cornish nationalist voters live in Cornwall doesn’t tell us
much about why people vote for Cornish nationalists.
As with region in the case of Cornish nationalism, class matters for the vote over space because it aﬀects, or
reﬂects, where we live. This tells us a lot about a little. Notice the range of district average class scores in ﬁgure
1 runs only from 1.8 to 2.4 whereas individuals’ class scores range from 1 (AB) to 4 (DE). The average
diﬀerence from the mean between individuals is ten times as great as that between districts.
Let’s therefore look at individuals: what the survey data tell us about why people voted Brexit. Imagine you have
a thousand British voters and must determine which way they voted. Figure 2 shows that if you guess, knowing
nothing about them, you’ll get 50 percent right on average. Armed with information on region or their economic
situation – income and social grade – your hit rate improves to about 54 percent, not much better than chance.
In other words, the big stories about haves versus have-nots, or London versus the regions, are less important.
Age or education, which are tied more strongly to identity, get you over 60 percent. Ethnicity is important but
tricky: minorities are much less likely to have voted Leave, but this tells us nothing about the White British
majority so doesn’t improve our overall predictive power much.
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Invisible attitudes are more powerful than group categories. If we know whether someone supports UKIP, Labour
or some other party, we increase our score to over 70 percent. The same is true for a person’s immigration
attitudes. Knowing whether someone thinks European uniﬁcation has gone too far takes us close to 80 percent
accuracy. But then, this is pretty much the same as asking about Brexit, minus a bit of risk appetite.
Figure 2, source: British Election Study 2015 Internet Panel, waves 1-3
For me, what really stands out about ﬁgure 2 is the importance of support for the death penalty. Nobody has
been out campaigning on this issue, yet it strongly correlates with Brexit voting intention. This speaks to a
deeper personality dimension which social psychologists like Bob Altemeyer – unfortunately in my view – dub
Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA). A less judgmental way of thinking about RWA is order versus openness.
The order-openness divide is emerging as the key political cleavage, overshadowing the left-right economic
dimension. This was noticed as early as the mid-1970s by Daniel Bell, but has become more pronounced as the
aging West’s ethnic transformation has accelerated.
Figure 3 shows that 71 percent of those most in favour of the death penalty indicated in 2015 that they would
vote to leave the EU. This falls to 20 percent among those most opposed to capital punishment. A similar picture
results for other RWA questions such as the importance of disciplining children. RWA is only tangentially related
to demographics. Education, class, income, gender and age play a role, but explain less than 10 percent of the
variation in support for the death penalty.
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Figure 3, source: British Election Study 2015 Internet Panel, waves 1-3.
Karen Stenner, author of the Authoritarian Dynamic, argues that people are divided between those who dislike
diﬀerence – signifying a disordered identity and environment – and those who embrace it. The former abhor both
ethnic and moral diversity. Many see the world as a dangerous place and wish to protect themselves from it.
Pat Dade at Cultural Dynamics has produced a heat map of the kinds of values that correspond to strong
Euroscepticism, and to each other. This is shown in ﬁgure 4. Disciplining children and whipping sex criminals
(circled), keeping the nation safe, protecting social order and skepticism (‘few products live up to the claims of
their advertisers…products don’t last as long as they used to’) correlate with Brexit sentiment. These attitude
dimensions cluster within the third of the map known as the ‘Settlers’, for whom belonging, certainty, roots and
safety are paramount. This segment is also disproportionately opposed to immigration in virtually every country
Dade has sampled. By contrast, people oriented toward success and display (‘Prospectors’), or who prioritise
expressive individualism and cultural equality (‘Pioneers’) voted Remain.
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Figure 4.
All told, the Brexit story is mainly about values, not economic inequality.
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